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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on the Utah 
Supreme Court by § 78-2-2(3)(j) U.C.A. (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct in its holding to enforce 
the release executed by appellant Andreini on July 9, 1987, thus 
granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Beck? 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court has 
held that it will affirm the trial court's decision where it 
appears there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of 
fact, or where, even according to the facts as contended by the 
losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. D&L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989). 
2. Was the trial court correct in denying appellant 
Andreini's motion to amend his complaint in light of the fact that 
it had granted summary judgment based on its finding that the 
release signed by Andreini was valid and enforceable? 
In reviewing the trial court's denial of appellant 
Andreini's motion to amend his complaint to add a cause of action 
for fraud, this court has held that such a ruling is not to be 
disturbed in the absence of a showing of an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion resulting in prejudice to the complaining party. 
Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action involves a medical malpractice claim arising 
from an injury allegedly caused during surgery performed by R. 
David Beck, M.D. (Beck) on Eugene R. Andreini's (Andreini) right 
knee on May 5, 1987. The summary judgment motion, which was filed 
on behalf of Dr. Beck and which was granted by the trial court, was 
based on the undisputed fact that Andreini, subsequent to the May 
5, 1987 surgery, signed a valid release, wherein he agreed to 
release Dr. Beck from any and all liability which may be associated 
with the surgery of May 5, 1987 in exchange for Dr. Beck's 
agreement to perform corrective surgery on July 9, 1987, at no cost 
to Andreini. The trial court found, as a matter of law, that 
Andreini signed the release at a time when he was not on any 
medication or in a life threatening situation, that valid 
consideration was given by Dr. Beck for the release, and that 
Andreini did not sign the release under any duress, collusion, 
intimidation, or undue influence by Dr. Beck or anyone representing 
him. The court further found, as a matter of law, that Andreini, 
at the time of signing the release, had reasonable alternatives and 
elected not to take them. Based on these findings, the trial court 
held that the release executed by Andreini was a valid and 
enforceable release of any claims he may have had against Dr. Beck 
and Holy Cross Hospital, and therefore, granted summary judgment in 
their favor. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. In approximately April of 1987, Eugene R. Andreini 
(Andreini) noticed that his right knee, which had previously been 
operated on at St. Mark's Hospital by Dr. Paul Pemberton, appeared 
quite swollen. (Depo. of Eugene R. Andreini, pp. 19, 20 and 29; 
included as part of Addendum hereto) 
2. In early May of 1987, due to the problems with his 
right knee, Andreini elected to have R. David Beck, M.D. (Dr. Beck) 
perform a complete knee replacement at Holy Cross Hospital. 
(Andreini Depo., p. 3 0; See Addendum) 
3. On the morning of May 5, 1987, Andreini was admitted 
to the operating room at Holy Cross Hospital, and the above-
mentioned surgery was performed by Dr. Beck, (Andreini Depo., p. 
31; See Addendum) 
4. In the days following the surgery on Andreini's knee, 
he noticed a tingling sensation in his fingers. He subsequently 
mentioned this to Dr. Beck who ordered elbow pads on about May 11, 
1987. (Andreini Depo., pp. 37-39; See Addendum) 
5. Following Andreini's discharge from Holy Cross 
Hospital after the May 5, 1987 surgery, Dr. Beck referred him to 
Dr. Nathaniel Nord, who tested him and indicated that there was 
compression paralysis. However, Dr. Nord could not say how or when 
this occurred. (Andreini Depo., pp. 45-46; See Addendum) 
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6. Subsequent to Dr. Nord's diagnosis, Dr. Beck 
recommended surgery, which was scheduled for July 9, 1987. 
(Andreini Depo., pp. 46-47; See Addendum) 
7. On July 9, 1987, Andreini was taken to a room at the 
Holy Cross Hospital and prepped for surgery. A nurse took his 
vital signs, but no medication was given to him at that time. 
(Andreini Depo., pp. 47-48; See Addendum) 
8. Approximately one-half hour to an hour before the 
scheduled surgery, a nurse brought Andreini a release form and 
stated that the release needed to be signed by him. A copy of said 
release is included herein as part of the Addendum. (Andreini 
Depo., pp. 48-52; See Addendum) 
9. After reading the release, Andreini told Clara Bates, 
the nurse, that he would not sign it. (Andreini Depo., pp. 52-53; 
See Addendum) 
10. Clara Bates then got Dr. Beck back on the telephone, 
and Andreini discussed signing the release with Dr. Beck. 
(Andreini Depo., p. 53; See Addendum) 
11. Andreini has admitted that, at that point, there was 
no reason that he couldn't get up and leave the hospital in the 
company of his mother and Sarah McCarthy. (Andreini Depo., pp. 53-
54; See Addendum) 
12. After talking with Dr. Beck on the telephone on the 
morning of July 9, 1987, and after gaining the understanding that 
the hospital and Dr. Beck would waive their fees in exchange for 
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his signature on the release, Andreini signed the above-mentioned 
release. (Andreini Depo., p. 56; See Addendum) 
13. Andreini was not forced to sign the above-mentioned 
release against his will. Indeed, he admits that he was "Given the 
choice of executing the release or not having the surgery". 
(Plaintiff's Complaint, p. 8, para. 21; R.00009) 
14. In his deposition, Andreini testified as follows 
with respect to the events surrounding his signing of the release 
in question: 
BY MR. FISHLER: 
Q. That's not - listen to my question. Had 
you wanted to at the time, you could have 
asked your mother and Sarah to take you from 
the hospital room and you could have left the 
hospital? 
A. Probably so. 
Q. So rather than have Sarah and your mother 
take you back whence you had come, you decided 
to sign the release? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you discuss signing the release with 
your mother and Sarah? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so as you understood it - as you/re in 
the room and after she brought the release up, 
you understood that you would sign the release 
and the hospital would waive its fee or 
charges, and Dr. Beck would allow you to make 
payments for his charges, as he said, chip 
away at them? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. You knew that if you signed the release, 
you were releasing Dr. Beck and the hospital? 
A. I guess I did. 
Q. Well, you knew that, didn't you? 
A. Yes. I didn't like it, didn't want to; 
but they had me in a trap and I had to do it. 
Q. And this trap that you are talking about 
is that you were kind of in life at a fork in 
the road and you had two choices that you have 
made: You could have had your mother and 
Sarah McCarthy take you out of the room, go 
back down to the vehicle in which you came to 
the hospital and go back to your home and find 
another hospital and find another doctor; that 
was a choice open to you? 
A. I guess so. 
Q. But just before you started to make the 
"E" in "Eugene" on this document, Exhibit 1, 
then your agreement with Dr. Beck was that he 
would waive his fee in its entirety in 
exchange for the release? 
A. That's obviously what he wanted me to do. 
Q. And is that what you did? 
A. It isn't what I wanted to do, but it is 
what I did. (Andreini Depo., pp. 53-61) 
15. The terms of the release signed by Andreini provided 
that Dr. Beck, was released from any claim by Andreini or on his 
behalf against Holy Cross Hospital or Dr. Beck for liability and 
damages which had occurred or might occur arising from the alleged 
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accidental incident during Andreini's total knee replacement on May 
5, 1987. (Exhibit to Andreini Depo.; R. 00140; See Addendum) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Dr. Beck since the release at issue was read and 
understood by Andreini and signed by his own free act. Although 
Andreini has attempted to create a factual dispute as to the 
signing of the release by alleging that he signed under duress, 
plaintiffs allegations are not supported by the undisputed facts 
which have been established in this case sufficient to withstand a 
motion for summary judgment. To establish legal duress, Andreini 
must be able to show that he was forced to act against his will in 
signing the release, and that he had no other viable alternative 
available to him. Through Andreini's own admission during his 
deposition, the undisputed fact was established that, at the time 
Andreini signed the release at issue in this case, he had the 
viable alternative available to him of simply leaving the hospital 
prior to signing the release and having another doctor perform the 
requested corrective surgery at another location. Therefore, the 
trial court was correct in finding that the release signed by 
Andreini was valid and enforceable, and that such provided a 
sufficient basis for granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Beck 
and Holy Cross Hospital. 
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Point II. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Andreini's motion to amend his complaint to add a cause of action 
for fraud in light of the fact that the court had granted summary 
judgment in favor of Dr. Beck and Holy Cross Hospital on the basis 
of the signed release. Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
allow a party to seek leave of court to amend a pleading, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the granting of leave to amend is a 
matter which lies within the broad discretion of the trial court, 
and that its rulings are not to be disturbed in the absence of a 
showing of an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the 
complaining party. In light of the court's findings with respect 
to the validity and enforceability of the release signed by 
Andreini, it was well within the court's discretion to deny the 
motion to amend the complaint in this case in order to add a cause 
of action which was not sustainable based on the undisputed facts 
as determined by the court in deciding the motion for summary 
judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF DR. BECK, SINCE THE RELEASE AT 
ISSUE WAS READ AND UNDERSTOOD BY 
ANDREINI AND SIGNED BY HIS OWN FREE 
ACT. 
Initially, it should be noted that the burden of proof 
required in order to avoid a signed release, is that the plaintiff 
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must come up with evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing of the released invalidity. Ulibarri v. Christensen, 
275 P.2d 170 (Utah 1954); and Jimenez v. O'Brien, 213 P.2d 337 
(Utah 1949). 
In Ulibarri. an action was brought for the wrongful death 
of a passenger in an automobile collision. However, approximately 
four days after the death of the passenger, his mother, her son, 
and daughter, and her husband, the deceased's step-father, executed 
a comprehensive "Release of All Claims". On the basis of this 
release, the trial court granted defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, plaintiffs argued 
that the release in question was invalid. Among other things, 
plaintiffs argued that the release was void because of fraud and 
duress. In affirming the trial court's decision to grant summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant based on the release, the Utah 
Supreme Court held as follows: 
The motion for summary judgment is for the 
purpose of expediting procedure and obviating 
trials where no genuine issue of fact exists. 
Where an affirmative defense is stated, such 
as a valid release, which would defeat the 
cause of action, it is the duty of the court 
to grant a judgment based thereon. 
. . . It is to be kept in mind that a release 
can be avoided only if the evidence of 
invalidity is clear and convincing, or, as has 
sometimes been said by this court, clear, 
unequivocal and convincing. If plaintiffs' 
representations to the court on the hearing of 
the motion were such that he concluded that no 
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reasonable jury (or finder of fact) could find 
that this burden had been met, then it was his 
duty to rule as a matter of law that the 
plaintiffs claimed cause of action against the 
defendants had been released. 
The only representations made with respect to 
duress related to the fact that the plaintiff 
was emotionally distressed because of the loss 
of her son, which likewise would be inadequate 
to overcome the release because of duress. 
Id. at 171-172. 
The general principles governing the use and application 
of a release have been discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of Horcran v. Industrial Design Corporation, 657 P. 2d 751 (Utah 
1982) . In that case, a former employee brought an action against 
his former employer seeking to recover additional compensation 
following his termination. Following a period of friction between 
the plaintiff employee and the defendant employer, the parties 
agreed to plaintiff's termination. Pursuant to the agreement 
between the parties, plaintiff received a substantial amount of 
money as termination compensation in return for signing a release 
whereby both parties waived all claims against the other and 
released each other from all obligations and liabilities arising 
out of the employment relationship. However, approximately a year 
and a half after signing the release and receiving the termination 
compensation, plaintiff filed an action against his former employer 
seeking additional termination compensation, and alleging that the 
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mutual release signed by plaintiff was unenforceable because he 
signed it under duress and coercion. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
former employer on the basis of the release executed by both 
parties, and the former employee appealed. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor 
of the former employer and held as follows with respect to the 
validity and enforceability of the release: 
The terms of the mutual release are 
undisputed. The release is comprehensive, 
precluding either party from ever asserting 
any employment related claim against the 
other. Also undisputed are the facts that 
plaintiff signed the release, and that he read 
it and understood its significance prior to 
signing. 
Plaintiff attempts to create a factual dispute 
as to the signing of the release by alleging 
that he signed under duress. The allegations 
of duress are that plaintiff was experiencing 
emotional distress from the unexpected loss of 
his employment and that he was in financial 
need of the termination compensation, 
especially the group health insurance, to help 
fund his handicapped son's impending surgery. 
. . . Whether those facts are sufficient to 
constitute duress is a question of law. . . . 
Generally, where an affirmative defense is 
stated, such as a valid release, which would 
defeat the cause of action, it is the duty of 
the court to grant a judgment based thereon. 
Plaintiff's only challenge to the validity of 
the release here at issue is that he signed it 
under duress, thus negating the mutual assent 
necessary for a valid contract. . . . In Fox 
v. Piercy, supra, we define duress as "any 
wrongful act or threat which actually puts the 
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victim in such fear as to compel him to act 
against his will." . . . 
The question is then whether the alleged 
wrongful conduct or threats by defendants 
compelled or coerced the plaintiff to sign the 
release against his will. . . . Plaintiff also 
claims to have signed under emotional distress 
caused by his termination, but emotional 
distress is not the equivalent of duress and 
is inadequate to invalidate the release. Nor 
is plaintiffs claimed financial need an 
adequate defense to the release. "The mere 
fact that a contract is entered into under 
stress of pecuniary necessity is insufficient 
to constitute duress." . . . 
To constitute legal duress, defendant must 
have acted against his will, and have had no 
other viable alternative. . . . 
In sum, plaintiff did not sign the mutual 
release under duress; the release is valid and 
enforceable and the plaintiff's suit is barred 
by the release. Id. at 752-754 (Citations 
omitted) (Emphasis added). 
See also Berube v. Fashion Center. Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989) (where the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that emotional 
distress is not the equivalent to duress, and that economic 
necessity alone is insufficient to invalidate a signed release.) 
In the present case, Andreini admits that he read and 
signed the release in question and has never alleged that he did 
not understand the terms of the release or the effect of signing 
it. In addition, he admits that he was given the choice to either 
sign the release or have the surgery performed somewhere else and 
by another physician, and agrees that he could have left the 
hospital in the company of his mother and Sarah McCarthy instead of 
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signing the release. Thus, Andreini has been unable to point to 
any facts established in the record supporting his allegation that 
he signed the release at issue under duress or coercion. He was 
not forced to sign the release against his will since he certainly 
had a viable alternative in simply leaving the hospital. 
Therefore, based on the clear and unambiguous terms of the release 
signed by Andreini on July 9, 1987, the trial court was correct in 
finding that he was barred from bringing the action against Dr. 
Beck, for any liability and damages which he alleged to have 
suffered as a result of the total knee replacement performed on May 
5, 1987. 
In support of his argument that the release was signed 
under duress, Andreini points out that "Neither appellee Beck nor 
appellee Holy Cross Hospital gave Andreini the alternative of 
paying for the corrective surgery." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 20) 
However, even if the court were to adopt this factual assertion by 
Andreini, such would not be sufficient to preclude the trial court 
from finding that, as a matter of law, plaintiff appellant signed 
the release as his own free act, despite the existence of at least 
one reasonable alternative, i.e., leaving the hospital with his 
mother and Sarah McCarthy to have a different doctor perform the 
corrective surgery. 
Further, in Andreini's argument, he implies that he was 
induced into signing the release based on the alleged 
representation that the corrective surgery would be 100% 
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successful. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 22; See Addendum) However, 
this misconstrues the actual terms of the release entered into by 
Andreini. He did not bargain for, nor did Dr. Beck agree to, a 
guaranty that the July 9, 1987 surgery would be 100% effective in 
correcting any and all ulnar nerve palsy from which he may have 
been suffering. Instead, the bargained for exchange to which 
Andreini agreed, was that he would "receive surgery". The language 
following the word "surgery" in the release which states that the 
surgery would be "to correct ulnar nerve palsy", is merely a 
description of the purpose for the surgery. It does not constitute 
a promise or guaranty on behalf of Dr. Beck that such surgery would 
be successful to any specific degree. In addition, it should be 
noted that, under Utah law, such a guarantee of a result, as 
suggested by Andreini, must be in writing and signed by the health 
care provider to be enforceable as a basis for liability. As 
stated in Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-6 (1953, as amended): 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for 
liability for breach of guarantee, warranty, 
contract or assurance of result. 
No liability shall be imposed upon any 
health care provider on the basis of an 
alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, or 
contract or assurance of result to be obtained 
from any health care rendered unless the 
guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is 
set forth in writing and signed by the health 
care provider or an authorized agent of the 
provider. Id. 
Therefore, since there was no written guarantee of a 
result signed by Dr. Beck, and since Andreini did receive the 
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surgery on July 9, 1987, as promised in the release which he signed 
on that date, Dr. Beck fully complied with the terms of the release 
and provided sufficient consideration to make the agreement, 
releasing Dr. Beck from any liability associated with the May 5, 
1987 surgery, valid and enforceable. 
Finally, Andreini argues that "appellee's threat of no 
surgery" constituted an "improper threat" amounting to duress under 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 175-176. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 22-23) The part of § 175 relied on by Andreini reads as 
follows: 
§ 175. When duress by threat makes a contract 
voidable. 
(1) If a party's manifestation of assent is 
induced by an improper threat by the other 
party that leaves the victim no reasonable 
alternative, the contract is voidable by the 
victim. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
§ 175(1) (1979). 
Andreini further cites the following subsections of § 176 
of the Restatement as being pertinent: 
§ 176. When a threat is improper. 
(1) A threat is improper if 
. . . 
(d) the threat is a breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing 
under a contract with the recipient. 
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting 
exchange is not on fair terms, and 
(a) The threatened act would harm 
the recipient and would not 
significantly benefit the party 
making the threat, 
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(b) The effectiveness of the threat 
in inducing the manifestation of 
assent is significantly increased by 
prior unfair dealing by the party 
making the threat, or 
(c) What is threatened is otherwise 
a use of power for illegitimate 
ends. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 176 (1979). 
Andreini goes on to argue that "The trial court failed to 
consider whether the actions and representations of Dr. Beck were 
a breach of good faith or otherwise improper", and therefore erred 
in its determination that duress was not involved because "the 
appellant had a reasonable alternative to executing the release". 
(Appellant's Brief, pg. 23) However, it should be pointed out 
that, contrary to appellant's assertion, the trial court's holdings 
are supported by the law as stated in the Comments to the 
Restatement sections cited by Andreini as support for his argument. 
The pertinent parts of the comments to those sections read as 
follows: 
§ 176 
Comment: 
a. Rationale. An ordinary offer to make a 
contract commonly involves an implied threat 
by one party, the offeror, not to make the 
contract unless his terms are accepted by the 
other party, the offeree. Such threats are an 
accepted part of the bargaining process. A 
threat does not amount to duress unless it is 
so improper as to amount to an abuse of that 
process. 
§ 175. 
Comment: 
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b. No reasonable alternative, A threat, even 
if improper, does not amount to duress if the 
victim has a reasonable alternative to 
succumbing and fails to take advantage of it. 
It is sometimes said that the threat must 
arouse such fear as precludes a party from 
exercising free will and judgment or that it 
must be such as would induce assent on the 
part of a brave man or a man of ordinary 
firmness. . . . In the case of a threatened 
denial of needed goods or services, the 
availability on the market of similar goods or 
services may afford a reasonable means of 
avoiding the threat. . . Whether the victim 
has a reasonable alternative is a mixed 
question of law and fact, to be answered in 
clear cases by the court. Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, §§ 175-176 (1979) 
(Emphasis added) 
In the instant case, it is clear that Andreini had a 
reasonable alternative to signing the release at issue. He has 
admitted himself that, prior to signing the release, he was free to 
simply leave the hospital in the company of his mother and Sarah 
McCarthy and to request that another physician perform the 
corrective surgery at another hospital. He has presented no 
evidence, nor would it be possible to present such evidence, that 
this was not a viable option available to him instead of signing a 
release and having Dr. Beck perform the surgery at Holy Cross 
Hospital. 
With respect to Andreini7s argument that Dr. Beck 
breached some sort of "fiduciary duty" in requiring that he sign 
the release and that such constituted duress, it should be pointed 
out that it is not the duty of a physician, nor should he be 
allowed, to take away from the patient his or her right to make a 
17 
decision between two possible courses of action with respect to his 
or her medical care or treatment. In that regard, Dr. Beck did not 
have a duty to provide legal advice concerning the effect of 
signing a release. In fact, Dr. Beck had a duty to allow Andreini 
to make his own decision about which course of action he should 
take with respect to his medical care. The fact that it might have 
been a difficult decision to make at the time, or the fact that he 
wanted the options to be different, did not somehow take away 
Andreini's freedom to choose, nor did it make the option of leaving 
the hospital and finding another doctor to perform the surgery an 
"unreasonable" alternative or one which was not viable. 
Therefore, the trial court was correct in finding that 
the release signed by Andreini was valid and enforceable, and that 
such provided a sufficient basis for granting summary judgment in 
favor of Dr. Beck and Holy Cross Hospital. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING 
ANDREINI'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT TO 
ADD A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD IN LIGHT OF 
THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAD GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DR. BECK AND HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL ON THE BASIS OF THE SIGNED RELEASE. 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 
party to seek leave of the court to amend a pleading. However, as 
the Utah Supreme Court held in Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 
(Utah 1983): 
In any event, the granting of leave to amend 
is a matter which lies within the broad 
18 
discretion of the court, and its ruling -. . 
not to be disturbed in the absence of a 
showing of an abuse of discretion resulting in 
prejudice to the complaining party, Id, at 
248. 
1 n Mi. • i nstant case , Andreini is unable l .. i * • | J , 
e v i d e n c e in i"i u««. ut ,«» I i i « I i W mid indicate that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying Lib mot in M mii-ini I ho complaint 
t .-I- MI -iiiJ""-! n action for fraud, or that such denij] 
resulted in prejudice i o i ii^ i-.n^ i, s i ncc ** ; «-lear • rom Trie 
facts on record that Andreini read and under a- ' ie 
release, ' iWivrM' rvervth'inq that hail been agreed to in 'he 
release, the court couid not -ue , |JM * | n i < ««« «1lowing him l;o 
• II'PO I I in i i.plaint hi incJude a c a u s e n£ a c t i o n tor iiii'iii ' M M , 
respeci to Uii .JJKMI.U , ,>N l» O1 tie was fraudulently I nduced i «itu 
signing the release. 
In I |iit i-if the court's findings with respect tu "lie 
validity and enforceability i i M1.-1 M'loarr, it was well within the 
court's discretion to deny the motion to make whal ^i; ni •' ly a 
useless aiiici iiim ui |M Mn complaint, adding a course of act i un which 
could not be sustained «11 K i f i MM. 'MM • i ,»i i* * n Vit'tn in the case as 
determined by the court in deciding the motion UJI .n i r y 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
• - • .?*«_•: - i n n t ci summary judgment ?\ f a , 
Di. Beck sfiould be d i t i r m e d ' .n r . •"• • menu ^ri n s p u t e t-
m a t e r i a i i s s u e s of f a c t , or ,o >"" .M/M I 
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facts as contended by Andreini, Dr. Beck is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. As found by the trial court, it is clear from the 
record in this case, that Andreini signed the release at issue as 
his own free act, despite admittedly being aware of at least one 
other viable alternative. In addition, the trial court was well 
within the broad discretion it is allowed with respect to its 
denial of Andreini7s motion to amend the complaint to include a 
cause of action for fraud. 
Therefore, the trial court's summary judgment in favor of 
Dr. Beck should be affirmed. ,. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of 1991. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Phillip K. Fishier 
Attorneys for Defendant Appellee 
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Philip R. Fishier, #1083 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE R. ANDREINI, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRUCE HULTGREN, M.D., R. DAVID 
BECK, M.D., and HOLY CROSS ] 
HOSPITAL, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 890905577PI 
i Judge Pat B. Brian 
The motion of the defendants, R. David Beck, M.D. and Holy 
Cross Hospital, came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Pat B. Brian, District Judge, on the 1st day of February, 1991 with 
Matt Biljanic appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, Philip R. 
Fishier appearing on behalf of R. David Beck, M.D., David W. Slagle 
appearing on behalf of Holy Cross Hospital and J. Anthony Eyre 
appearing on behalf of Bruce Hultgren, M.D. The Court having 
considered the memoranda on file herein together with the exhibits 
as well as argument of counsel and being fully advised in the 
premises now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. That on or about May 5, 1987 R. David Beck, M.D., an 
orthopedic surgeon operated on the right knee of the plaintiff. In 
this operation, which was performed at Holy Cross Hospital, Dr. 
Bruce Hultgren acted as anesthesiologist. 
2. In the days following the surgery on plaintiff's knee 
plaintiff noticed a tingling sensation in his fingers. 
3. Following plaintiff's discharge from Holy Cross Hospital, 
the plaintiff was diagnosed as having a compression paralysis. 
4. That subsequent to Dr. Nord's diagnosis, Dr. Beck 
recommended surgery which was scheduled for July 9, 1987. 
5. That shortly prior to the surgery the plaintiff was 
presented with a release by Clara Bates, an employee of Holy Cross 
Hospital. 
6. That plaintiff told Clara Bates that he would not sign the 
release. 
7. That Dr. Beck then spoke with the plaintiff. 
8. At that point in time, there was no reason why plaintiff 
could not have left the hospital in the company of his mother and 
Sarah McCarthy who had brought him to the hospital. 
9. That prior to signing the release plaintiff discussed the 
release with his mother and Sarah McCarthy. 
10. That plaintiff signed the release, the language of which 
is as follows: 
111, EUGENE R. ANDREINI, will receive surgery 
to correct ulnar nerve palsy at approximately 
10:00 a.m., July 9, 1987, with Holy Cross 
Hospital of Salt Lake City, Utah and David 
Beck, M.D., bearing all costs for this 
procedure as payment of service. 
I recognize this arrangement, made to me, as 
-2-
total compensation for the alleged accidental 
incident occurring during total knee joint 
replacement on May 5, 1987, does not consti-
tute an acknowledgement of responsibility by 
Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake City for said 
accidental incident, and do hereby release, 
acquit, and forswear any claim, by me or on my 
behalf, against Holy Cross Hospital of Salt 
Lake City, and David Beck, M.D. for liability 
and damages which have occurred or may occur 
arising from said accidental incident." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiff at the time he signed the Release was 
not on any medication nor was he in a life-threatening situation. 
2. That valid consideration was given by Holy Cross Hospital 
and Dr. Beck for the release and that this consideration was the 
free surgical procedure offered by Dr. Beck and the free hospital 
care offered by Holy Cross Hospital which was accepted by plain-
tiff. 
3. That at the time of the signing of the release the 
plaintiff was not operating under any duress, collusion, 
intimidation or undue influence by either Dr. Beck or personnel at 
the Holy Cross Hospital. 
4. That the plaintiff at the time of signing the release had 
reasonable alternatives and elected not to take them. 
5. That the release executed by the plaintiff on July 9, 1987 
released any of plaintiff's claims that he may have then had or 
thereafter had against Dr. Beck, the Holy Cross Hospital and its 
personnel. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having entered its Findings of 
-3-
Facts, Conclusions of Law and it appearing to the Court that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motions 
for Summary Judgment of defendants Holy Cross Hospital and R. David 
Beck, M.D. be and the same are hereby granted and plaintifffs 
complaint as to these defendants is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this ^T day of February, 1991. 
ppepaid to:— 
Matt Biljanic 
Attorney at Law 
7355 South Ninth East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
David W. Slagle 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN fie MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE R. ANDREINI, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
BRUCE HULTGREN, M.D., R. DAVID 
BECK, M.D., and HOLY CROSS ] 
HOSPITAL, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
I ORDER 
1 Civil No. 890905577PI 
i Judge Pat B. Brian 
The motion of the plaintiff for leave to file an amended 
complaint came on regular for hearing on the 1st day of February, 
1991 before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge with Matt 
Biljanic appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, Philip R. Fishier 
appearing on behalf of defendant R. David Beck, M.D., David w. 
Slagle appearing on behalf of defendant Holy Cross Hospital and J. 
Anthony Eyre appearing on behalf of defendant Hultgren and the 
Court having heard argument of counsel and good cause appearing, 
more particularly, the Court having granted Summary Judgment in 
favor of all defendants, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File An Amended Complaint be 
and the same is hereby denied. 
DATED this VV day of February, 1991. 
By the Court 
Approved as to Form: 
Th4 Honorable Pat 
AAcC56~ 
4attvBiliaj M FtVBiljan£c 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
isj? I hereby certify that on this / ^ day of February, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage 
prepaid to: 
Matt Biljanic 
Attorney at Law 
7355 South Ninth East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
David W. Slagle 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
J. Anthony Eyre 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE R. ANDREINI, ] 
Plaintiff, ] Deposition of: 
vs. ] Eugene R. Andreini 
BRUCE HULTGREN, M.D., et al.,] 
] Civil No. 890905577PI 
Defendants. ] 
| BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day of August. 
1990, commencing at the approximate hour of 10:00 a.m., 
the deposition of Eugene R. Andreini was taken at the law 
offices of Strong & Hanni, Sixth Floor Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, before Julie N. Clegg, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah. 
* * * 
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1 neurologist, or whatever; and he referred me to Dr- Beck. 
| And they took x-rays; and my hips, I guess they go egg-
shaped or something instead of round and they had to be 
replaced 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
after. 
Q. 
A. 
• 
And did you have hip surgery with Dr. Beck? 
Yes. 
Which hospital was that at? 
Holy Cross. 
Both sides? 
Yes, on two separate occasions. 
When was the surgery? Was that in '84? 
I believe so. 
Were there any complications with that surgery? 
No. I think the other one was like the year 
Did you have an orthopedic surgeon in Price? 
No. They don't have anything specialized like 
that down there. 
Q. 
prior to 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Have you been to see any other orthopedists 
January of 1984? 
You mean forever and ever? 
Forever and ever. 
When I was a teenager, I guess I'd gone to Paul 
Pemberton. 
Q. What did you see him for? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
16-17. 
Q. 
A. 
local < 
Knees, knee, knee surgery. 
What did he do for you? 
Operated on me. 
Which hospital? 
St. Mark's. 
Was it an athletic injury of some type or — ? 
Athletics. And then I got hit with a truck. 
When was that? 
When I was in the 10th grade, whatever that is, 
Was that in Price? 
Yes, and had a couple of knee surgeries done by 
doctors down there. They were anything but 
orthopedic surgeons. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Who operated on you down there? 
Dr. Denman did one. 
Spell that last name. 
D-E-N-M-A-N. 
D-E-N — 
Yes, M-A-N. And Dr. Gonzales. 
When did this occur? 
In the fifties when I was a teenager. 
Was that done in Price? 
Yes. 
What prompted the surgery with Dr. Denman and 
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1 Q. When was it that you decided you wanted to have 
2 surgery on your knee? 
3 A. When it swoll up and I couldn't straighten it 
4 out. 
5
 Q. When was that? Was it in 1987, or did you want 
6 to have the surgery before that? 
7 \ A. The 3 0 days before the operation, it was just 
straight out and puffed up. I just had enough — some 
9 time with him to get some things in order so that I could 
10 take the time off. 
11 J Q. Where were you working at the time? 
12 A. At Bargain Tire. 
13 Q. Have you sold the business? 
14
 A. I think I was just starting up the — or helping 
15 start the CBS thing, too, right at that time. It was 
16 just — I'm not quite sure on that. It was right in that 
*7 period. I was needing time off to go get the surgery and 
18 everything; so it's my impression that I probably made 
19 the deal with him before that so that I could take the 
20 time off, because he told me I would need two or three 
21 months. 
22 Q. So you made the deal to sell Bargain Tire to 
23 your partner before the knee surgery? 
24 A. Yes, or at least — not the sale part of it. 
25 It's more like I'm on the payroll type thing; and then 
29 
1 after I had drawn so much, I give it to him- So you can 
2 call it a sale or whatever you want, but it isn't like 
3 there's a note or a contract or anything like that, you 
4 know. 
5 Q. This agreement, it was all verbal? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Is he current on the payments? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And these payments run out in '92, about? 
10 A. I believe in '91 or '92. 
11 Q. Do you recall the date of the surgery, the knee 
12 surgery? 
13 A. May 5th. 
14 Q. Do you recall the day you were admitted? 
15 MR. BILJANIC: If you know. 
16 THE WITNESS: I don't know. Either that day or 
17 the day before. 
18 Q. (By Mr. Fishier) Did Dr. Beck tell you what he 
19 anticipated doing with your right knee? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. What did he tell you? 
22 A. He was going to do a complete knee replacement. 
23 Q. Did you have a fairly good relationship with Dr. 
24 Beck? 
25 A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you feel that he was easy to communicate 
with? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he answer all your questions? 
A. Yes. 
MR. BILJANIC: Excuse me. Can we have a time-
frame on that, Phil? When you are saying, "answering all 
your questions," what time-frame are you talking about? 
MR. FISHLER: Ever since he's known Dr. Beck. 
THE WITNESS: No. This is up until the time 
that he did my knee. It seemed like — well, even at the 
time he did the knee, it was okay. It was when I started 
having trouble with my hands that our relationship 
changed quite drastically. 
Q. (By Mr. Fishier) Do you recall what time the 
surgery was, what time they took you to surgery, 
approximately, on the 5th of May? 
A. In the morning. 
Q. Can you tell me what the last thing is you 
remember prior to the surgery of May 5th, 1987? 
A. The last thing I remember? 
Q. Do you remember being in your room on the floor? 
A. Yeah. I even remembered being on the operating 
table and they were hooking up the I.V. 
Q. Was Dr. Beck there? 
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restrained during the operation? 
A. No. 
Q. When you woke up in the hospital room on the 
floor, how did your knee feel? 
A. Painful. 
Q. Did you notice anything else unusual about your 
condition? 
A. I was in quite an extreme amount of pain for the 
first few hours, and the only other thing that I 
noticed — and it didn't seem important to me at the 
time — was on my little fingers just — just like a 
little — like the touch of a feather on the outside 
edges of my fingers. 
Q. What do you mean by it felt like a touch of a 
feather? 
A. Just like barely feels like — barely, barely 
touching the skin on the outside edge of your little 
finger, like a tingling — little tingling sensation. It 
wasn't painful and it wasn't any discomfort. 
Q. When did you first notice that? 
A. Oh, as soon as I started regaining consciousness 
pretty good, you know, to where I was out from under the 
effects of the anesthesia or the pain medication, or 
whatever it was, where I could talk and was coherent. 
Q. Was this while you were in the room? 
37 
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1 A- Yes. 
2 Q # Did you mention this to anyone? 
3 A. Well, I mentioned it to my mother and Sarah, and 
4 I I mentioned it to the nurse. But it never got in the 
charts, so — 
6 Q. Who was the nurse? 
7 A. I don't have any idea. She just was asking the 
8
 routine common questions, it seemed like: "How do you 
9 feel? or "Did you notice anything?" — or whatever. But 
10 she didn't think it was important about as much as 
Jl probably I didn't at that time. 
12 Q. And about when was it that you mentioned this to* 
13 the nurse? 
14
 A. It was probably the first or second day. I 
15 mean, it wasn't — I wasn't really — like I said, it — 
16 i wasn't really that concerned at that time. I had so 
17
 much pain in my leg and stuff, I was preoccupied with 
18 that. 
19 Q. we talk about what we call the first 
20
 postoperative day and the first postoperative day would 
21 be May 6th. Are you with me when I say what the first 
22 postoperative day is? 
23
 A. Sure. 
24 Q. Did you mention this to anyone prior to the 
25
 first postoperative day? 
A. Prior to the first postoperative day? That 
would be the day that I came out from surgery? 
Q. No. That would be the operative day. May 5th 
was the operative day. On May 5th, did you mention this 
to anyone? 
A. My mother and Sarah and the nurse, I believe. 
The nurse was either the first or second day. 
Q. Okay. Did you tell anyone else? 
A. On the third or fourth day, to the physical 
therapist because they were getting me up. 
Q. Did this symptom, this tingling, this mild 
tingling on your — in your little fingers — did that 
condition ever change? 
A. It slowly increased. When I say, "slowly," I 
mean to the point where I was concerned enough about it 
that I talked to Dr. Beck, And I think on the 11th he 
ordered some kind of elbow pads or something. 
Q. Let's talk about May 6th. 
A. Oh. There was one other person that I mentioned 
it to. 
Q. Who? 
A. Dr. Nichols came by, just dropped in to see me. 
Q. What day was that? 
A. Oh, I don't know. About the fourth day, or 
something like that, when he knew I was —(pause.) I 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Was the progression the same? 
Yes. 
Did you ever talk to anyone on the nursing staff 
who ventured an opinion about what the cause of this 
problem 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
just — 
was? 
Not the nurses, the physical therapists. 
And what did the physical therapists say? 
They were real noncommital about anything. They 
the only comment, they would like it — like my 
hands were kind of numb. It was like what they called a 
glove e 
that th 
ffect, your hands feel like — up in the wrist, 
is — that you are in a glove. 
They didn't want to get in the middle of nothing 
or nobody. They were — 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
before 
Q-
operate 
A. 
should 
Q-
Dr. Hultgren, did you ever discuss it with him? 
Never seen him after the surgery. 
Did you ever see him before the surgery? 
One day when he came in. I think it was the day 
or the day after, or something like that. 
Did Dr. Beck ever suggest that someone ought to 
on your arms? 
I kept complaining to him until he told me I 
go see Dr. Nord, a neurologist, friend of his. 
Did you go see Nord? 
i A. Yes. 
2 Q. Did Dr. Nord ever venture an opinion as to what 
3 had happened? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. What did Nord say? 
6 A. He said they were — it was a compression 
7 paralysis and they were — the nerves were not 
8 anatomically severed, but electrically severed. 
9 Q. Did he venture an opinion as to how or when this 
10 occurred? 
11 A. No. He just gave his opinion as to what he 
2 2 found with the tests. And that test's a honey, too. 
13 Q. To the best of your knowledge, Dr. Nord's 
14 findings were reported to Dr. Beck? 
15 A. Yes. He mailed the report directly to Dr. 
16 Beck. 
17 Q. Did you ever discuss the-report with Dr. Beck? 
IS A. Yes; and that's when Dr. Beck said maybe we 
19 should do the surgery — I think it was called "relief" 
20 or "release" the ulnar nerve, or something like that. 
21 Q. Did you then have the surgery scheduled? 
22 A. No, not at that time. He told me that he wanted 
23 to confer with some of his colleagues, he said. 
24 Q. Did he ever tell you what he found out when he 
25 conferred with his colleagues? 
46 
1 A. He told me to call him back and we would 
2 schedule the surgery, 
3 Q. Did you call him back? 
4 A. Yes, 
5 Q. Did he ever say anything else about what the 
5 cause was of the problem? 
7 A. No, he never — other than what I told you, that 
S it was — it could have been hereditary, it could have 
9 been my system. It could have been a lot of things, you 
10 know. 
11 Q. Did he ever indicate results of the operation or 
12 what happened during the operation on May 5th, 1987? 
13 A. No. He was always pretty careful about acting 
14 like it was my fault. 
15 Q. Did you ever have a meeting with anyone at the 
16 hospital about the upcoming surgery that was scheduled in 
17 July for the operation on your arms? 
18 I A. No. 
19 Q. Your arms were operated on on July 9th, 1987? 
20 A. Yes. 
2! Q. Do you recall what day you got to the hospital? 
22 A. It was an a.m. admit. 
23 Q. And were you taken to a room? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And how long were you in the room before you 
47 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
were taken to surgery? 
A. 
And then 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
They came in and shaved my arms, they preped me. 
the nurses came in and took my vital signs. 
What? Your blood pressure? 
What's that? 
Your blood pressure? 
Yes. 
And your pulse? 
Yes. 
Then what happened? 
Just about at that time the lady come up from 
the office, the hospital administrator's office, I guess, 
with the 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
to her? 
A. 
I would 1 
Q-
A. 
form and 
it. 
release form. 
Who was this lady? 
I don't know what her name was. 
What does she look like? 
Middle-aged lady. 
And what did she say to you and what did you say 
She said in order to have the surgery performed, 
have to sign this release form. 
What did you say? 
That I hadn't talked to nobody about a release 
it was news to me, and I wasn't going to sign 
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1 Q. Did you have medical insurance at the time? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. You didn't have anything with Bargain Tire? 
4 A. No. 
5
 Q. Do you have medical insurance now? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Did you have medical insurance at the time the 
8
 right knee was operated on? 
9 A. The right knee, that's the one that Dr. Beck 
10 did? 
H Q. Yes, sir. 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. How did you plan to pay for the operation, the 
*4 hospital charges on the right knee surgery? 
15 A. I wrote them a check. 
16 Q. When you went into the hospital, what was your 
17 understanding as to who was to pay for the hospital bill? 
18 A. I wasn't certain. I'd talked to Dr. Beck on the 
19 phone a few days before when we -- when he made the 
20 appointment, and told me to show up Thursday morning. 
21 And I'd mentioned to him at that time when him and I 
22 talked about the surgery, that I had talked to a lady who 
23 was a nurse at McKay-Dee Hospital; and she told me to ask 
24 the doctor if he would talk to the hospital, that 
25 sometimes they would give you some relief on a follow-up 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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8 
9 
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11 
12 
13 
14 
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16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
thing like this, you know, where it looked like it might 
be somebody's fault. And he said that he would talk to 
the hospital for me. And so — and I hadn't talked to 
him since, so I didn't know. 
Q. So you discussed with Dr. Beck that the hospital 
might waive its fee? 
A. 
behalf. 
Q-
was she? 
A. 
mine. I 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
the hosp 
A. 
Q. 
subject 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. He was going to talk to the hospital in my 
This lady that you talked to at McKay-Dee, who 
She was just an acquaintance of a friend of 
don't even know her name. 
Who was the friend that knows her? 
His name is Ted. 
Who was that? What's his last name? 
I could find out, I guess. 
Okay. 
If it's important. 
This nurse at McKay-Dee said that quite possibly 
ital might waive its fee? 
Yes. 
And then you called Dr. Beck and broached that 
with him? 
Right. 
He said he'd talk to the hospital about it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have any arrangements with Dr. Beck 
about his charges for the operation? 
A. He told me that he knew that I had gone under a 
lot of financial strain, that the total was supposed to 
be between eight and ten thousand, and it was up around 
sixteen thousand, and that I could — that he would do 
the surgery and I could just chip away at it, is how he 
put it. 
He told me he has people that don't have 
insurance that he lets them make like monthly payments, 
things like that. 
Q. Had you already paid the bill to the hospital 
for the right-knee surgery? 
A. I paid — I think it was eleven thousand five 
hundred, something like that — was what the bill was at 
the time of discharge. Then I had — after that there 
was a lot of physical therapy and things of that nature. 
And the doctor's fee, that wasn't included on that. 
Q. How many conversations did you have with Dr. 
Beck about the hospital waiving its fee? 
A. Just the one on — the one phone-call that I had 
with him. 
Q. Did he ever mention that you might have to sign 
a release? 
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A. 
Q. 
marked 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
[Deposition Exhibit 1 marked 
for identification.] 
(By Mr. Fishier) I'll show you what's been 
as Exhibit 1. Can you identify that document? 
Yes. 
And what is it? 
It's the release that I signed the morning of 
the surgery. 
Q. Mentions here that this surgery was to commence 
at approximately 10:00 a.m.; is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I'm not sure. 
About what time did you sign the release? 
Probably a half-hour, 45 minutes, maybe, before 
the surgery. Possibly an hour. 
Q. When this lady brought the release in, were you 
alone in the room? 
A. 
the two 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
medicat 
A. 
Q. 
No. My mother was there and Sarah McCarthy, and 
nurses. 
Did you read the release? 
Yes. 
At that point in time, had you received any 
ion? 
I'm not sure. 
Did you discuss this release with your mother 
5 
6 
1 and Sarah? 
2 A, I told — Clara Bates, I guess is who she was, 
3 now that I see her name on there — that I wasn't going 
4 to sign it- So she got Dr. Beck on the phone. 
5 Q. And what did Dr. Beck say? 
A. He told me that if I wanted to have the surgery, 
7 I I had to sign the release; and if I didn't sign the 
8 release, he was going to play hardball with me. Those 
9 were his exact words. 
20 Q* What did you take that to mean? 
11 A. That he was just going to let me figure out how 
22 to take care of my hands myself, I guess. 
23 Q. You knew there were other orthopedists in the 
14 city, didn't you? 
25 A. I guess so. 
26 Q- Okay. Is there any reason why you couldn't have 
17 just gotten up out of the bed, put your clothes back on 
lg and walked out? 
19 A. Other than the fact that I was extremely upset 
20 and just had the surgery two months before and I was on 
2i crutches and upset and my hands had deteriorated 'til I 
22 looked like a skeleton. 
23 Q. That's not — listen to my question. Had you 
24 wanted to at the time, you could have asked your mother 
25 and Sarah to take you from the hospital room and you 
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could 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
teleph 
A. 
end. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
have left the hospital? 
Probably so. 
Who took you to the hospital? 
My mother and Sarah. 
And they were still there? 
Yes. 
Did anyone else hear what was said on the 
one by Dr. Beck? 
I don't believe so. They couldn't hear on my 
They just knew how upset I was. 
Did you tell them what Beck said? 
Yeah. 
So rather than have Sarah and your mother take 
you back when she would come, you decided to sign the 
release? 
A. 
Q. 
mother 
A. 
Q. 
you. 
A. 
me on 
know, 
Yes. 
Did you discuss signing the release with your 
or Sarah? 
Yes. 
Tell me what you said to them and they said to 
I said according to Dr. Beck's conversation with 
the phone right before we made the appointment, you 
two or three days before, he indicated to me that 
in most cases after two or three weeks after the 
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successful, the July surgery was successful, you weren't 
going to make any claim against anyone; is that correct? 
A. That's correct, 
Q. You understood that the hospital would waive its 
fee or its charges. Did you expect to give anything to 
the hospital in exchange for that? 
A. I didn't know whether they were going to do it 
or not. He said he would mention it. 
Q. Did Clara Bates, or whomever brought that 
release up — did she tell you that the hospital would 
waive its fee? 
A. It says in the — in the paper that she gave me. 
Q. But she also told you that? 
A. I don't know. I guess. 
Q. And so as you understood it — as you're in the 
room and after she brought the release up, you understood 
that you would sign the release and the hospital would 
waive its fee or charges, and Dr. Beck would allow you to 
make payments for his charges, as he said, chip away at 
them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you understood that that was the position of 
the hospital and the position of Dr. Beck? 
A. I didn't know prior to this release that the 
hospital was going to demand a release. 
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Q. Okay, But I want to talk about that window of 
time when the release is in the room with you, Clara 
Bates, your mother and Sarah McCarthy. You knew at the 
time that Beck was going — what he was going to do was 
perform the operation, but allow you to make payments on 
his fee and the hospital would waive its fee if you would 
sign the release? 
A- I guess that's what it says here. Let me read 
this again- (pause.) 
I guess the part that upset me more than 
anything was he had included himself after we had made a 
deal, or he would do the surgery and I would make, 
payments. 
Q. Okay. But you understood before you signed the 
release what everyone's position was; you understood what 
the hospital wanted, the hospital wanted a release and 
they would waive their fee; you knew that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew that Dr. Beck would do the surgery and 
allow you to make payments for his fee? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you knew to get both of these commitments, 
one from the hospital and another commitment from Dr. 
Beck, that you had to sign the release? 
A. I knew that I had to sign the release to get the 
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surgery done. That was my prime concern. 
Q. By Dr. Beck? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On that day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you selected — knowing Dr. Beck's position 
and knowing the hospital's position, your choice was to 
sign the release and have the surgery done on those 
conditions on that day? 
A. (Pause.) 
Q. Yes? 
A. That's a question? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I knew that if I signed it, they would do the 
argery. 
Q. You knew that if you signed the release, you 
ire releasing Dr. Beck and the hospital? 
A. I guess I did. 
Q. Well, you new that, didn't you? 
A. Yes. I didn't like it, didn't want to; but they 
i me in a trap and I had to do it. 
Q. And this trap that you're talking about is, is 
it you were kind of in your life at a fork in the road 
you had two choices that you could have made: You 
Id have had your mother and Sarah McCarthy take you 
out of the room, go back down to the vehicle in which you 
came to the hospital and go back to your home and find 
another hospital and find another doctor; that was a 
choice that was open to you? 
A. I guess so. 
Q. And the other choice to you was to sign the 
release and then go forward with the surgery, with the 
understanding that the hospital would waive its fee, Dr. 
Beck would allow you to make payments on the fee in 
exchange for the release; is that right? 
A. You lost me on Dr. Beck's. 
Q. Dr. Beck would do the surgery and allow you to 
make payments on the fee? 
A. That was the agreement I had with him before 
this showed up. 
Q. And after this showed up — referring to 
Exhibit 1 — you entered into a new agreement with him 
whereby you would have the surgery done by Dr. Beck, you 
would release Dr. Beck and Dr. Beck would allow you to 
make payments on this surgical fee; is that correct? 
A. You're losing me on the surgical-fee part. 
Q. He was going to let you make payments? 
A. You mean — it sounds like something he would 
do. He wants the release and the money; is that what 
you're saying? 
Q. Yes. But he would let you pay the money over 
time; that was your understanding? 
A. No. There was never any release mentioned to 
him. 
Q. I'm talking about after the phone-call with Dr. 
Beck when you're in the hospital room and just before the 
instant before you started to write the 'E' in "Eugene." 
Your agreement with Dr. Beck was, is that he would do the 
surgery and let you make payments in exchange for you 
giving him this document that we have marked as 
Exhibit'1? 
A. I don't believe that's true, because I think it 
says here: "I recognize this agreement, made to me, as a 
total compensation." "Total compensation," not make 
payments to. 
Q. Okay. So your understanding then was Dr. Beck 
was going to waive his fee? 
A. But that isn't what he told me up until one hour 
before surgery. That's why I was so upset and mad. It 
seemed unprofessional to spring this on you one hour 
before surgery. 
Q. But just before you start to make the 'E' in 
"Eugene" on this document, Exhibit 1, then your agreement 
with Dr. Beck was he would waive his fee in its entirety 
in exchange for the release? 
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A, That's obviously what he wanted me to do, 
Q. And is that what you did? 
A, It isn't what I wanted to do, but it is what I 
did. 
Q. That's what you did, okay. And you made that 
choice, rather than have your mother and Sarah take you 
away, out of the hospital? 
A. Well, I thought the choice was, rather than have 
my hands the way they were permanently. 
Q. But you could have gone someplace else. You 
could have gone to any of the other orthopedists in town? 
A. I'm not sure, knowing what I know about doctors 
now, that they would have even handled me, knowing what 
there was about it. But that's neither here nor there. 
MR. FISHLER: Let me take a short break. 
[Recess.] 
MR. FISHLER: Back on the record. 
Q. During the break, Mr. Andreini, you had an 
opportunity to confer with counsel? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What's the next thing you remember after signing 
the release? What happened to you after that? 
A. The nurses took my blood pressure again. 
Q. And then what happened? 
A. They told me that it was really, really high, 
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RELEASE FROM LIABILITY 
AND 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT I 
(/. Ar/A (^vy 
I, EUGENE R. ANDREINI, will receive surgery to correct ulnar nerve 
palsy at approximately 10:00 a.m., July 9, 1987, with Holy Cross Hospital 
of Salt Lake City, Utah and David Beck, M.D., bearing all costs for this 
procedure as payment of services. 
I recognize this arrangement, made to me, as total compensation for 
the alleged accidental incident occurring during total knee joint 
replacement on May 5, 1987, does not constitute an acknowledgment of 
responsibility by Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake City for said 
accidental incident, and do hereby release, acquit, and forswear any 
claim, by me or on my behalf, against Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake 
City, and David Beck, M.D. for liability and damages which have occurred 
or may occur arising from said accidental incident. 
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